Planning for Justice: Race, Planning and Power from Liberalism to Neoliberalism

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Not even a month after Barack Obama was inaugurated, he signed an executive order creating a cabinet-level Office of Urban Affairs to implement “a comprehensive approach to urban development.” One of the administration’s first domestic policy initiatives, it signaled a new presidential commitment to cities. Not since Jimmy Carter created an interagency “Urban Policy Research Group” in 1977 has there been anything resembling a comprehensive White House directed urban policy. For most of the last four decades, cities have been pretty close to the bottom of the list of presidential priorities. Carter’s attempt at a comprehensive urban policy crashed and burned on the anti-inflationary politics and fiscal restraint of the late 70s. It was followed a period of steady federal withdrawal from the cities began in the Reagan era and was countered only by the mostly troubled enterprise and empowerment zone programs and by various HUD-directed experiments like HOPE VI—under the aegis of one of the most troubled executive branch agencies in history.¹

My purpose in this paper is not to offer a premature evaluation of Obama’s urban policy. Only one pattern is clear (documented in a Russell Sage Foundation-sponsored project led by Harvard’s Theda Skocpol and Minnesota’s Lawrence Jacobs): namely, the Obama administration shifted the priorities of several key executive branch departments, mostly beneath the media’s radar. While Obama’s education, financial reform, and health care policies have dominated the news, the administration has also substantially reorganized the Department of Labor, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which is arguably under its ablest leadership in decades. Obama’s urban policy appointees have included experienced urban planners and analysts such as Shaun Donovan (HUD) and Xavier
Briggs from MIT (OMB), but the new Urban Affairs office has been affected by
turnover, headed first (and briefly) former Bronx Borough President Adolfo Carrion, then
Derek Douglas, a former aide to New York governor David Patterson, later Xavier
Briggs, an MIT planner and now Ford Foundation executive, and staffed by a young aide,
Lauren Dunn, a recent Tufts graduate. Over seven years into the Obama administration,
it is not yet possible to offer a comprehensive overview of the impact of these personnel
changes and the programmatic shifts that they are undertaking. The task of evaluation
will require, at a minimum, exit interviews with administration officials and local and
state officials responsible for urban and regional planning; and the release of internal
memoranda and reports; and a comprehensive analysis of economic and demographic
data.  

Any analysis of Obama’s urban reform efforts must come to terms with the larger
context—with the feedback loops and institutional paths that shape and constrain options
available to the administration. The administration entered office with a vague mandate
for “change,” but as scholars of American political development have long noted, change
occurs within the parameters established by previous policy regimes, in the context of
established political institutions and policy frameworks. This paper offers a polity-
centered approach, one that considers the relationship of social movements,
policymaking, and implementation in the realm of urban policy, with attention to patterns
in urban planning and politics that emerged in the last great moment in the history of
urban planning and policymaking---the period from the mid 1960s through the late
1970s. It is fitting that America’s first African American president faced a policy regime
that grew out of government responses to the demands of civil rights, black power, and
community control activists in the mid-twentieth century. To understand where we are and where we are going with urban policy, it is necessary for a moment to look backward as the first step to moving forward.3

To understand Obama’s urban policy choices requires examining the intertwined histories of race and planning, with an eye toward the ways that racial inequalities shaped urban life; how grassroots activists put pressure on the political system through protest, community organization, litigation, and lobbying; and how policymakers, planners, and politicians responded. The last generation of urban policy innovation was the consequence of social movements and activists shaping policy, both directly and indirectly. Twentieth-century urban policy had a number of goals—improving public health, increasing efficiency, maintaining or increasing land values, implementing new technologies. But from the New Deal on forward, urban planning and policymaking was fundamentally intertwined with race. Racialized understandings of public health, actuarial method, and real estate valuation shaped efforts by planners, developers, and policymakers to regulate land use. During the New Deal, racial classifications fundamentally shaped federal pro-homeownership initiatives under the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, Federal Housing Administration, and Veterans Administration. Likewise, racial considerations (namely public officials’ unwillingness to alter patterns of segregation) determined the implementation of federal public housing programs. Post-New Deal urban policy initiatives also had profound implications for the racial geography of metropolitan America. In the 1940s and 1950s, the federal bulldozer (to borrow Martin Anderson’s evocative phrase) plowed through black neighborhoods, because of racialized understandings of blight. The planners who used federal funds to construct urban
hospitals, civic centers, university campuses, highways, suburban housing developments, and public housing projects reinforced entrenched patterns of racial segregation in metropolitan space by displacing minority residents and creating buffer zones around nearby minority neighborhoods. Recently, revisionist scholars and policymakers have looked back wistfully at ambitious mid-twentieth-century urban redevelopment efforts and large-scale infrastructure projects. (Even New York’s “master builder” Robert Moses, once scorned by planners and architects, has enjoyed a revival.) But whatever we think of the ambitions of mid-century urban planning, it is clear that it exacerbated patterns of racial separation and division.

Even without segregative intent, federally-supported infrastructure and development programs accelerated larger transformations that affected central cities and their growing minority populations. The Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act (1949), the Interstate Highway Act (1956), the Urban Renewal Act (1956), and the Model Cities Program (1966) did not stem (and often accelerated) the decentralization of capital to suburban communities, rural areas, and increasingly to the Sunbelt. Second, despite the massive centralization of federal power and the expansion of federal bureaucracy in the New Deal and in postwar years, public policy left the lion’s share of decisions about federal housing, economic development, land use, and infrastructure programs (and later education) to states and municipalities. The persistence of localism in modern America exacerbated place-based (which were almost inevitably race-based) inequalities in metropolitan areas, allowing what sociologist Charles Tilly calls opportunity hoarding by suburban whites, leading to the inequitable distribution of public goods like education, social services, and infrastructure in ways that advantaged whites and systematically
disadvantaged African Americans. Third was the devastation of a generation of black business and capital because of urban renewal. “Negro removal” not only displaced tens of thousands of blacks—but it also ravaged the majority of black businesses who rented their properties, were uncompensated for their losses, and who could not simply up and relocate elsewhere and expect that their customers would follow.\textsuperscript{6}

The course of post-New Deal urban policy began to shift in the 1960s, the result of a myriad of challenges to the legitimacy of liberal planning—from across the political spectrum. Prominent critics on the right, including political scientist Edward Banfield and economist Martin Anderson, focused on the high cost and marginal benefits of urban renewal projects and singled out the devastating impact of redevelopment on local economies. Urban critics, including Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Gans, lamented the destruction of vital urban enclaves in the service of modernist utopianism. And architects and preservationists—among them Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown—led a charge against what they saw as the antiurbanism of mid-century urban planning, highway construction, and modern architecture. But to a great extent, these professionals and intellectuals were supporting characters in the battle over urban policy and planning that played out in the 1960s—because at core, urban issues in 1960s America were still defined by race.\textsuperscript{7}

Beginning in the early 1960s, civil rights and black power activists mounted a sustained challenge to thirty years of urban policy orthodoxy, offering a systemic critique of urban development, planning, and land use policy. The burst of black protest against urban planning in northern cities caught many observers wholly off guard. In most cities through the 1950s, civil rights organizations stood on the sidelines when it came to urban
renewal, highway construction, and public housing. Urban blacks were still relatively powerless politically—in the South, they lacked the vote and in the North and West, they lacked the numbers in all but a handful of places to gain more than a handful of elected offices. Further holding back black protest were the strategies of mainstream civil rights groups and of mostly middle-class black political leaders: they mostly accommodated white officials and when they did rock the boat, they turned to battles over private sector discrimination.  

By the early 1960s, the urban black population had grown substantially, blacks moved into city council positions and municipal governments, and civil rights groups gained political clout. In addition, a younger generation of more militant activists pushed for more systemic changes than had their predecessors. Civil rights and community groups used the power of the vote to put pressure on elected officials. Many neighborhood organizations and civic groups—often with substantial foundation funding—experimented with new forms of governance, creating what one observer called “cement-roots” organizations dedicated to improving urban living conditions. And local leaders—in civil rights groups, in elected office, and in community organizations fashioned an increasingly vocal critique of New Deal and post-New Deal urban policies. They emphasized the long-term costs of urban renewal and infrastructure projects, the effects of systemic residential and educational segregation, and cast doubt on the wisdom of economic development strategies that decentralized commerce and manufacturing, while minority populations remained concentrated in job-poor central cities. Adding to the sense of urgency, many activists threatened disruption and disorder through protest
and sometimes violence to attempt to force policymakers at all levels (from city halls to school boards to federal housing agencies) to take their demands seriously.\(^9\)

Ultimately, grassroots activists grappling with the “urban crisis” forced an “urban policy crisis” by the mid-1960s. Urban policy and urban planning would never be the same.

As the urban crisis intensified in the early 1960s---two strains of policy advocacy emerged to challenge the liberal planning and urban policy regime. Ultimately, only one prevailed. The first, I will call, *integrationist planning*; the second *community control*. The first---integrationist planning---brought the principles of open housing, civil rights, and regionalism to bear on housing, economic development, and education policy. Throughout the postwar years, integrationist planners represented a small but increasingly influential current in urban policy. They were attracted to federal and local housing agencies, city and state civil rights commissions, and city planning departments. And they had prominent allies in academia, civil rights and religious groups, liberal foundations, and the news media. In the early 1960s, they used their combined clout to push for policy innovation in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and, just as importantly, looked to New Frontier and Great Society initiatives as a vehicle for reshaping metropolitan America. Integrationist planners challenged existing urban policies from within (often working in federal agencies, including the Federal Housing Administration and, later, the Department of Housing and Urban Development).

Integrationist planning had its roots in post-new Deal liberalism, even as they worked to correct what they saw as its deficiencies. Above all, they saw urban planning
and housing policy as a form of social engineering—they believed that sound planning would be both efficient but, if reformed, could also further the goals of racial equality. One particularly influential cadre of activist planners saw the solution to the urban crisis—in the creation of a racially integrated society. Integrationist planners’ predecessors in the 1940s and 1950s saw the key to achieving racial equality in education and moral suasion, namely eradicating racial inequality by changing the hearts and minds of white Americans. But by the 1960s, they offered a more structural critique of racism that required more than gradualism. Civil rights activists had delegitimized overt expressions of racial prejudice, but they had not altered residential and educational segregation in practice. To bridge the persistent gap between an increasingly widespread rhetoric of colorblindness and the reality of segregation required stronger measures.  

Increasingly, integrationist planners thought about race in a regional context—and attempted to undermine segregation through four tactics: first, rewriting land use and zoning laws to permit the construction of low income housing in the suburbs; second, by redrawning school district attendance zones to eliminate segregated education; and third, by drafting and passing open housing laws (at the state and local level) and pressing for their enforcement through litigation. Through national organizations like the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCADH), they circulated policy recommendations, strategized, lobbied elected officials, and provided resources for local governments and federal agencies alike. Integrationist planners’ fundamental goal was the dispersion of the African American population throughout metropolitan areas and, secondarily, the maintenance of stable integration in urban neighborhoods through programs to attract or retain whites.
Leading activist planner Clarence Funnye (an African American city planner who began his career with the Congress of Racial Equality, joined NCADH, and became one of the highest ranking black planners in the newly created HUD) coined the term “deghettoization.” For integrationist planners like Funnye, diversity was a means to an end, not a goal in itself. Desegregating the housing market and schools would redress the imbalance of resources that maintained black-white gaps in educational outcomes, job opportunities, and income. They drew on the work of economists and sociologists (like John Kain, whose pioneering work on the “spatial mismatch” emphasized the causal connection between segregation and labor market opportunities). To integrate metropolitan America was a high stakes proposition---it would give blacks access to the booming suburban job market, access to the rapidly expanding consumer marketplace in suburbs, and access to well-funded suburban schools. It would also spread the burdens of taxation and social service provision over entire regions, rather than leading city governments left with most of the responsibility for poverty and social dislocation.¹²

The second current in 1960s urban policymaking and planning emphasized community control. Advocates of community control eschewed the principles of integration and the tools of regional planning. Community control advocates challenged federal and local planners and policymakers from outside. Unlike integrationist planners, community control advocates were deeply skeptical of centralized planning and instead demanded participatory democracy. They argued that community-based organizations could better address urban problems than city, state, or federal officials who were distant from the needs of their constituents.
Community control advocates also rejected the tools of modernist planning and offered an alternative paradigm, one that hoped to solve the urban crisis by creating or strengthening grassroots organizations, maximizing black economic power, and demanding citizen participation at every stage of the process of planning and policymaking. If the integrationist planners emphasized solutions to racial inequality on a metropolitan-wide scale, community control activists, by contrast, emphasized micro-level interventions. They turned their focus to the neighborhood or the community as the appropriate unit of analysis.

Not only did community control advocates think locally, but they were also equally concerned with process and outcome. Citizen participation in the planning process was an end in itself—it would enhance democracy by empowering the poor, giving them control over their own communities and their own lives. Community control activists believed that change would come from the bottom up—from poor people using their collective power to resist the political and economic system that long marginalized them. In addition, they would deploy what James Scott would later call their “local knowledge” to the problems at hand, thus avoiding the unintended consequences of bureaucratically controlled policy and interventionist social engineering.13

Integrationist planners were at core democratic centralists—they believed that the goals of urban planning and racial inclusion were best overseen by experts who could put long-term policy goals and systemic change ahead of short-term, localistic, and ephemeral interests. Activist planners were at core technocratic. Community control activists, by contrast, were ultimately anti-technocratic. They recoiled at the failure of planning—however well intentioned—that imposed a vision of society from the top
down. Instead of advocating for an alternative model of urban planning, they rejected it altogether in favor of small-scale, intensely localistic efforts.

Integrationist planners and community control activists differed in another fundamental respect---they had widely divergent views about the very nature of community itself. For integrationist planners, community was a problematic concept, because community formation entailed the drawing of boundaries that reinforced exclusion and difference. Integrationists saw communities as dangerously exclusionary. They offered a structural critique of localism itself. Building on the work of the Chicago School sociologists, they emphasized the ways that bounded communities were premised on the spatial separation of groups, but moving beyond the Chicago School (which assumed that over time, mobility and assimilation would mitigate group differences), they turned attention toward the unequal allocation of resources by place. Building from the insights of the then-growing field of regional planning and regional science, they argued that the proliferation of municipalities was both inefficient and unjust, especially because municipal boundaries (because of decades of pro-segregation housing policies) usually corresponded exactly with racial boundaries. Addressing racial inequality meant eliminating boundaries that wastefully duplicated services, distributed tax dollars inefficiently, and solidified racial differences in metropolitan space.14

Community control activists, by contrast, celebrated the very concept of “community.” They drew from a deep-rooted American romantic conception of the virtues of localism. Rather than seeing community as a vehicle of exclusion, they saw community as a set of affective ties, a series of relationships that fostered a sense of identity and solidarity---and that gave individuals the resources for collective action.
Community could be the base of resistance to the status quo. Community was fundamentally liberatory. Addressing the urban crisis meant strengthening community and creating institutions that fostered it.\textsuperscript{15}

Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, both groups---integrationist planners and community control activists---co-existed, but they seldom interacted, except with mutual suspicion and hostility. Integrationist planners were, to their critics, elitist social engineers. Black power advocates, in particular, offered a scathing critique of integrationist planners, whom they accused of wanting to weaken the black community and dilute black political power by dispersing the black population. As Stokely Carmichael, one of the key theorists and promoters of black power, put it, “The fact is that integration, as traditionally articulated, would abolish the black community.” Jesse Gray, the founding father of the tenants’ rights movement and a leading advocate of community control, argued: “I’m for the black communities remaining intact. If they disperse the communities, they’ll only create smaller ghettos subservient to the white middle class. If they remain intact, they’ll have some power.”\textsuperscript{16}

By contrast, integrationist planners saw the process of community empowerment as “gilding the ghetto.” Integrationist planner Funnyé offered a scathing evaluation of a community activists by focusing on a 38-unit rehabilitation project on Harlem’s West 114\textsuperscript{th} Street: “Do the planners believe that mere flick of paint and plaster is sufficient to eradicate or even offset the deficiencies inherent in the pathetically bad neighborhood schools to which the children of 114\textsuperscript{th} Street, and all the children in Harlem, would still be confined?” Efforts to rehabilitate ghetto housing, in his words replicated the “traditional containment practice” of confining blacks to run-down disadvantaged
neighborhoods. “Creating and maintaining a little oasis in the midst of one of the most
dense ghettos in the world,” argued Funnyé, wearing his hat as an activist planner, “goes
against all sound planning theories.”

Both of these views ultimately had elements of truth of them---both, if
synthesized, could provide a powerful model for comprehensive city planning. But in the
polarized political atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s, they remained at loggerheads.
Improving living conditions in the inner city could be a short-term strategy---and
deghettoization could be a long-term strategy. But few saw it that way.

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Ultimately the history of urban policymaking in the 1960s and 1970s was one of
community control activists prevailing over integrationist planners, with a few
noteworthy exceptions. Community control activists—and their political allies---wholly
recast the debate over race, rights, and equality in the United States. They modified the
practice of “top down” planning and forced the incorporation of community participation
(even if it was often more symbolic than real) into the planning process. The rise of
community control dovetailed with a broad shift in federal policy: a growing emphasis on
the devolution of power. By the 1970s, everyone’s horizon shrunk as blocks, wards, and
city halls, not Congress and the White House, federal housing agencies and metropolitan
regions, becoming the primary battlegrounds for the future of black America.

To understand why community control prevailed, we need first to examine the
failure of integrationist planning—an enterprise that looked most promising in the early
1960s. Integrationist planners faced one very serious obstacle to their goal of opening
metropolitan housing markets and dispersing the black and white populations. They had little clout over local elected officials who used zoning, planning and land use regulations to maintain racial and economic homogeneity. Efforts to integrate places as diverse blue collar communities like Cicero, Illinois and Warren, Michigan met with insuperable hurdles; the battle to open up the quintessentially middle-class Levittowns met with limited success, and efforts to integrate upscale suburbs like Great Neck and Chappaqua, New York and Deerfield, Illinois failed nearly completely. Deghettoization required opening suburban housing markets and, at the same time, dispersing affordable and public housing. But even where communities had anti-housing discrimination laws, they were difficult to enforce. Local and state anti-housing discrimination laws were usually symbolic rather than toothful. And Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (the Fair Housing Act of 1968), a law that also proved less effective than its advocates had hoped. Title VIII required costly litigation and investigations---and depended on private advocacy law firms or individuals to file claims and seek redress. Not surprisingly efforts to construct affordable housing met with even higher obstacles. It proved nearly impossible to persuade local elected officials to accept scattered-site public housing or even high-density, affordable housing complexes, for fear of alienating their constituents.  

Integrationist planners’ next, even more ambitious goal was to use federal policy to support—even require---pro-integrative regional planning efforts. They found a fickle ally in the Johnson administration. In 1965 and 1966, the Johnson instituted sweeping urban policy reforms---his administration created the Department of Housing and Urban Development---and chose as its first head economist Robert Weaver, the first African American cabinet member and a long-time advocate of regional planning and racial
equality. And Johnson signed into law a new program—the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act---also known as Model Cities. Both HUD and Model Cities, at their outset, were charged with grappling with metropolitan problems on a regional basis, but both faced serious obstacles almost from the outset. Both were meant to improve on the disastrous urban renewal programs of the 1950s by targeting both inner cities and suburbs simultaneously—to clear slums, to create mixed income and mixed race communities throughout metropolitan areas. HUD’s mandate also included comprehensive regional planning efforts. As a result of its early ambitions, HUD, for a time, became a magnet for integrationist planners—bright, idealistic, and hopeful that with government on their side, they could transform metropolitan America.¹⁹

But the Johnson’s administration’s regionalism quickly came under fire from both left and right. As Congress turned rightward after the midterm elections of 1966, both HUD and Model Cities struggled to get adequate funding. Members of Congress with white constituents had little interest in funding regional solutions to urban problems. Model Cities also came under criticism from community control activists who saw it (despite its nods toward community participation) as a gussied up version of 1950s-style urban renewal. As cities and towns exploded in uprising—168 cities rioted in the summer of 1967 alone—Johnson’s administration came to see Model Cities as a form of riot insurance and, to that end, channeled more funds to inner cities, jettisoning most of what remained of the regionalist agenda. Thwarted at the moment of greatest possibility, integrationist planners soldiered on—but in an atmosphere of fiscal and ideological constraint.²⁰
Community control activists, on the other hand, gained support from nearly every quarter. They turned their attention to the immediate needs of poor people and their neighborhoods, focusing on improving living conditions in public housing and in rundown inner-city apartments. They promised immediate results—not the long-term changes that integrationist planners had hoped to accomplish. The sense of urgency—the poor were living in execrable conditions—led many leading civil rights organizations, most notably the Congress of Racial Equality, to give up on housing integration—and turn instead to tenant and neighborhood organizing. And a growing and increasingly vocal cadre of black militants and their white allies argued that integration was a pipe dream that distracted attention from more urgent concerns like lead paint and other health and safety hazards, poor sanitation in inner city neighborhoods, inadequate retail options, and rent-gouging. Inner city residents, they contended, could not wait for the Holy Grail of integration: they needed better living conditions here and now.

Community control advocacy was swept up in the small, but vocal movement for black power. Local affiliates of civil rights organizations like CORE and SNCC were captured by black nationalists. Hundreds of insurgent organizations, like the Black Panthers, the Revolutionary Action Movement, US, and many others, sprung up, promising self-determination. Even established groups like the Urban League and the NAACP faced pressure to shift their priorities to community organizing and to couch their demands in more militant rhetoric. CORE, already skeptical of integration, asserted that “Black Power is effective control and self-determination by men of color in their own areas. Power is total control of the economic, political, educational, and social life of our community from the top to the bottom.” Or as the New York Black Panthers put it:
“BLACK POWER MEANS…where we are in the majority, in a place like Harlem or Bedford-Stuyvesant, we use our majority to win political and economic power—We run things.” Pressure from vocal black radical groups also pushed the second generation of black urban politicians toward community control. Even if they eschewed black power rhetoric, thousands of community organizations sprung up in the mid-1960s—in one of the greatest nationwide experiments in grassroots policymaking.21

But radical or not, community control persisted because it tapped into the structures of American localism. The impulse toward community control and community participation was deeply rooted in traditions of local governance in the United States. It was, in this respect, fundamentally conservative. Community activists drew from the long tradition of black self-help and uplift that emphasized the importance of self-improvement in service of community betterment. But they grafted it onto an increasingly vocal critique of “white power”—a category that included well meaning but condescending white liberals and activist planners and conservative white racists alike.

More importantly, community control became a big tent that attracted support from across the political spectrum. The first group of supporters consisted of activists on the left, especially campus radicals and architects, planners, and social scientists who offered powerful intellectual rejections of technocracy and bureaucracy. Black calls for community control offered a fundamental affirmation of their view that society could be remade from the below, from ordinary people taking power into their own hands.

The second—and fickle ally—was the Johnson administration, whose quest for a comprehensive urban policy and whose fear of black rebellion, led to one of the most short-lived but influential experiments in urban policy and governance: the Community
Action Program, which channeled federal antipoverty dollars to grassroots community groups and in the process brought the federal government into league with activists who called for community based solutions to poverty and social dislocation. In the first year of the War on Poverty, over 1,000 community action agencies throughout the country received federal funding. Many of these organizations opened offices in predominantly black neighborhoods and drew their staff from neighborhood residents, and by 1968, four-fifths of them were run by private, non-profit organizations directly funded by OEO. Community action was even more controversial politically than Model Cities. Republican critics of community action (and a growing and vocal group of Democrats, especially big-city mayors whose power was threatened by federally-funded non-governmental organizations) highlighted examples of radical groups that received funding from the Office of Economic Opportunity, the agency that administered the Community Action Program. Big city mayors—especially in places with robust machines—viewed CAP as a threat to their power. But even if Community Action was short-lived, its call for “maximum feasible participation” legitimated the strategy of the insurgent movement of community control activists and would remain, well after the Great Society was dead, a key impulse in urban planning and policymaking.22

Community Action crystallized the notion that the struggle for racial justice must fundamentally be local and community-based, and that urban problems were best dealt with on a piece-by-piece, neighborhood- by-neighborhood basis. For the next forty years—even as the War on Poverty receded into distant memory—the battle against poverty and inequality would be fought largely at the local and neighborhood level. The Great Society left in its wake a whole generation of local politicians, planners,
community organizations, and grassroots activists who believed in the importance of community control and place-based public policies that targeted inner-cities and their poor residents.

By the end of the 1960s, community control activists accepted the concentration of poor blacks in inner cities as a given—an unalterable reality of modern American life. But rather than seeing racial segregation as a problem, as did activist planners, they saw it as an opportunity. Increasingly they advocated what political scientist Michael Dawson calls “community nationalism, one that derived from the ideology of self-determination and argument for community-based economic development.” The goal was to empower blacks (and in the process diffuse discontent) by creating neighborhood-based businesses and non-profits, unmonopolized by whites. They would keep black jobs in the inner cities, rather than forcing the ghetto (or as it was described by many activists the “internal colony”) to “export” its labor to white-dominated firms. But for all of its radical rhetoric, the call for community economic development had a surprisingly wide appeal—it was a pliable enough concept to attract black power advocates (who saw it as the next stage of black liberation) and black self-help conservatives (like the venerable Urban League and, even more traditionally, local Booker T. Washington Business Associations), white liberals (especially those who were skeptical of bureaucracy), white leftists (who often shared romantic views about “indigenous” activists), but also some machine politicians (who realized they could create or co-opt community organizations) and self-help conservatives (who were skeptical of “big government” and who argued for the devolution of power to its smallest possible unit). Black economic development was bankrolled by white foundations and corporations (especially the Fortune 500 backed
Urban Coalition), and increasingly supported by federal programs like the Small Business Administration.  

By the early 1970s, advocates of community control of various persuasions began to rally around a new non-governmental organization: the community development corporation. CDCs offered a hybrid approach—they offered a small-scale alternative to urban renewal and an ostensibly more participatory form of governance than city redevelopment authorities. As corporations, they appealed to advocates of self-help and fueled the growing impulse toward privatization. Because of their broad, non-partisan ideological appeal, CDCs managed simultaneously to appeal to leftist and black power oriented critics of activist planning; businesses and foundations looking for ways to bankroll economic development; and conservatives hoping to devolve power from government agencies to private organizations.

Unexpectedly, community-based development found its staunchest support in the Nixon administration. In 1968, Nixon pledged, both on the campaign trail and in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, to support the principle of black economic self-determination. Once elected, Nixon reached out to many black power activists (among them CORE’s Roy Innis and SNCC’s Floyd McKissick) and even sent delegates to the black-power inspired National Black Political Convention in 1972. And Nixon won kudos among advocates of community development for his support of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise. The Nixon administration’s reasons for the embrace of a tempered version of black power were ideologically muddled: a mix of electoral self-interest (Nixon’s advisors hoped, rather too optimistically, that the GOP could capture the “Negro silent majority”), concern over ongoing black discontent (riot
insurance), and a desire to supplant costly social welfare programs with less expensive, voluntaristic, public-private initiatives. At the same time, Nixon aligned his administration against integrationist planners. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, open housing advocates and regional planners worked to decentralize public housing, to enforce antidiscrimination laws vigorously, and implement pro-integrative suburban housing policies. But Nixon announced his opposition to what he called “the forced integration of the suburbs” and curbed HUD efforts to regionalize affordable housing. And Nixon railed against unpopular programs to desegregate schools, aligned with critics of “forced busing” and slowed Department of Education efforts to break down the barriers between city and suburban school districts. By 1973, Nixon put into place a “new federalism” that thwarted the regional initiatives that activist planners had long advocated. William Safire, writing for Nixon and his domestic policy advisors, argued that Nixon was creating a "national localism" that "says to communities, `Do it your way.'" To that end, Nixon created the Community Development Block Grant program as an alternative to the myriad of more interventionist, liberal urban programs. CDBGs gave urban mayors more influence over the allocation of federal urban spending than many community control advocates would have preferred, but still prioritized small-scale local community development projects and spurred the proliferation of community development corporations. Integrationist planners—without a steady ally in the federal government—turned their efforts to litigation at the state level and to privately-funded efforts in open housing in localities, where the scale of their efforts was by necessity small in scale. Victory in the courts (as
in New Jersey’s lengthy Mount Laurel litigation) was often thwarted by state legislatures; and pro-integrative efforts at the local level met with indifference or outright hostility by most local elected officials and their constituents. The most successful pro-integrative plans like the court-ordered Gautreaux plan that provided suburban housing options to Chicago public housing residents, were widely hailed but seldom replicated.28

Nixon laid the groundwork for Jimmy Carter’s urban policy. The election of a Democrat initially gave hope to integrationist planners. When the former Georgia governor entered the White House, civil rights groups pushed for a sweeping “urban Marshall plan” and regional planners pushed for “people-based” rather than “place-based” policies to address urban problems. Instead they got something that fundamentally resembled Nixon’s new federalism. Carter shared his Republican critics’ animosity toward large-scale urban liberalism and embraced an alternative vision of community empowerment and local self-help. ”The community people,” wrote two Carter advisors, “do not want such federal intrusions of money, but rather the tools to help themselves and reliable, longer-term commitments of incremental assistance.” Drawing from the rhetoric of decentralization that enjoyed support from both free marketers on the right and community-based activists on the left, the Carter administration advocated the “empowerment” of "mediating institutions" that would, it was believed, provide an antidote to impersonal, distant bureaucracy. 29

Whatever the merits of Carter’s urban agenda, it quickly fell to the wayside as the economy soured. By the winter of 1978-1979, Carter began the process of trimming urban expenditures in his austerity budget. The administration's anti-inflation advisor, Alfred E. Kahn, bluntly told urban officials that the government could not afford even its modest
urban spending and that "the prescribed medicine is restraint." One urban activist responded that "we are heading into a completely new era and we don't know what to make of it."

What remained was the commitment to relying on community development and small non-profit organizations to bear the burden of urban redevelopment, but with even less federal support than in the previous administrations. 30

What Kahn described as the new era continued in the Reagan administration, which cut urban expenditures even more steeply, without the fear of political retribution that had held the Carter administration back. The Republican base was white, disproportionately suburban and rural, mostly indifferent to urban problems, and skeptical of federal spending on cities. Only a handful of prominent GOP figures—like the quirky Buffalo libertarian Jack Kemp and some of the remnant band of Northeastern Rockefeller Republicans—saw any good reason to target urban areas. Not surprisingly, Reagan took the budgetary axe to programs that benefited central cities and minorities. Under the rubric of the “New Federalism”—a more aggressive version of Nixon’s plan—the Republican White House proposed a series of programs to devolve governmental decision making to localities that coincided with a dramatic reduction in federal urban spending. Reagan winnowed public housing programs; cut social service spending; and trimmed aid to mass transit.

Community control advocates were not pleased with Reagan’s significant cuts to the CDBG program, but by the 1980s, they had built a solid financial infrastructure, and the most successful CDCs drew support from corporate donors, churches, local philanthropists, and national foundations. The weakest and poorest funded CDCs withered, but those that had professionalized to take advantage of federal spending in the 1970s and had also built robust private-sector connections survived. Still, between 1980
and 1990, the federal share of local government expenditures fell dramatically, from nearly 12 percent to just over 3 percent. The result was that at the very moment that cities were reeling with the combined effects of disinvestment, growing poverty, population loss, and a collapse in tax revenue, the federal government withdrew much of its support. Historian Carl Abbott estimated that city governments bore two-thirds of the cost of Reagan-era budget cuts.³¹

Both integrationist planners and community control advocates found themselves on the margins in the 1980s and beyond, but the institutional forms created during the late 1960s and 1970s persisted. By the 1980s, community development corporations had proliferated and professionalized and their vision of community-based economic development, even if it reeled financially, remained intact. And the emphasis on citizen participation, even if it was more symbolic than real, remained in place. Enterprise and empowerment zones—initiatives undertaken in the first Bush and Clinton administrations—did not fundamentally depart from the small-scale, place-based strategies pioneered in the 1970s. They mandated community participation, they channeled small grants and tax incentives to local projects. And they built on the institutional forms that emerged in the 1960s and 1980s—relying on localistic responses that targeted impoverished places.

To be sure, integrationist planning did not wholly wither at the end of the twentieth century. Beginning in the early 1990s, some prominent social scientists and urban policymakers offered a latter-day version of integrationist planning. University of Minnesota law professor Myron Orfield and Albuquerque, New Mexico mayor David Rusk resuscitated arguments that dated back to the late 1950s, calling for the creation of
regional governance to mitigate the effects of urban disinvestment, concentrated poverty, and racial segregation. This neo-regionalism gained even more currency in liberal policy circles through the Brookings Institution’s newly-created Metropolitan Policy Program, launched in 1996. And the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs conducted audit studies of housing discrimination—continuing an initiative launched by groups like NCDH in the 1960s. And it made small-scale gestures toward integration through its Moving to Opportunity program, an experiment implemented during the Clinton administration, which provided counseling and vouchers to public housing residents to move to low poverty communities, many of them in suburbs. But such efforts were mostly hortatory.32

CDCs and empowerment zones were the logical outgrowth of urban policy innovation through the lens of community control. But they faced serious limitations in the dramatically changing urban economic climate of the last three decades of the twentieth century---what I call an urban policy mismatch. The urban crisis had worsened in the 1960s and 1970s---with the hemorrhage of jobs and capital, and ongoing massive white suburbanization. The root causes of the urban crisis in the 1960s and 1970s were national and global in scope---but the solutions were small in scale and as the community control paradigm was institutionalized, they grew smaller. Community development projects, however beneficial on a very small scale, did not aggregate to foster larger urban change. The community control paradigm was inadequate in scope and scale to address larger structural problems like economic restructuring, regional governance, public transit, and the continuing spatialization of racial inequality. Ultimately, community development organizations, which numbered nearly a thousand nationwide at
their peak, had the will but not the capacity to deal with what were ultimately metropolitan problems. 33

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Barack Obama came of political age in this period—first as a community organizer in the 1980s, then as an elected official representing a majority-minority district in the 1990s. His impulses—always synthetic—have been influenced by both community control and integrationist planning. As a young activist in Chicago, in the mid-1980s, Obama gravitated toward small-scale community organizing efforts. In one of his earliest published pieces (written in 1988, just as he left Chicago for Harvard Law School), Obama called for “bringing together churches, block clubs, parent groups and any other institutions in a given community to pay dues, hire organizers, conduct research, develop leadership, hold rallies and education campaigns, and begin drawing up plans on a whole range of issues.” In concert, the city’s poor could overcome their powerlessness by pooling their resources and challenging politicians to be more responsive to community needs. In principle, Obama supported the goal of community organization across racial lines. But in bitterly segregated Chicago, he directed most of his energy toward working with the African American residents of the segregated Altgeld Gardens housing project, in their efforts to remove deteriorating asbestos insulation from their buildings. Obama’s efforts were often frustrating. Meetings were often poorly attended and only a small handful of Altgeld residents actively joined the effort. Mobilizing the poor was difficult, community participation was time consuming, and usually just a few vocal, often self-appointed community leaders supported the effort. In addition, although Obama’s
Altgeld Gardens efforts were inspired by a national community organization movement that crystallized around the principles of Saul Alinsky, the campaign was not even part of a citywide movement, much less a region-wide or national effort to improve housing or reshape public policy. Ultimately, Obama and community residents successfully persuaded the Chicago City Council to allocate money to asbestos abatement, but the situation of Altgeld Gardens residents—marginal to the city’s economy, their housing slowly deteriorating because of vandalism and disinvestment, their neighborhood wholly segregated by race—scarcely changed for the better.  

Obama reflected on the frustrations of his mostly solo campaign: “Sometimes I called a meeting, and nobody showed up,” he recalled. “Sometimes preachers said, ‘Why should I listen to you?’ Sometimes we tried to hold politicians accountable, and they didn’t show up. I couldn’t tell whether I got more out of it than this neighborhood.” In the immediate aftermath of the Altgeld Gardens victory he worried that community-based development projects “can and have become thinly veiled excuses for cutting back on social programs, which are anathema to a conservative agenda.” By the early 1990s, Obama—keenly aware of the limits of community participation—turned to the law and electoral politics, largely leaving behind his short-lived career as a community organizer. As a lawyer, Obama found himself drawn to programs like majority minority legislative districts that grew from the same impulse as community organizing (especially the emphasis on the links between group identity, representation and interest), but at the same time, defended in principle educational and housing integration—although they were never priorities in his legal work or his legislative career.
Whatever his understanding of integration and community control, Obama’s urban policy was fundamentally shaped by the legacies of federal programs dating back to the Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations. It is unclear what direction Obama’s urban initiatives will take, given the tension in his own career between community-based and regional approaches to urban problems. Under Obama, HUD seems more committed to metropolitan and regional issues in ways reminiscent of its early years under Weaver. And the Department of Justice has at least begun to resuscitate a pro-integrative agenda. The DOJ joined a lawsuit (won in a federal court in New York) that requires Westchester County, New York, communities to construct affordable housing to expand options for minorities in the job-rich suburbs. Of all of the causes of racial inequality, the one that has most animated Obama has been education. In his Philadelphia speech, Obama forcefully reiterated a now-unpopular argument for racial integration in public education. “Segregated schools were, and are, inferior schools; we still haven’t fixed them, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, and the inferior education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive achievement gap between today’s black and white students.” But Obama’s educational policies in practice de-emphasize integration.36

But despite his rhetorical nod to Brown, Obama’s educational policy takes for granted the persistence of racially segregated schools, despite evidence that racial and socioeconomic diversity in schools is strongly correlated with better educational outcomes. Pro-integrative policies are politically unpopular: many African Americans have accepted racial segregation, so long as their schools are funded at a level comparable to that of majority-white schools. And most whites accept school segregation
as a natural consequence of market choices, while remaining indifferent at best, actively 
opposed at worst, to even voluntary programs to desegregate schools. The consequence is 
that at the same time that the Obama administration has expanded federal funding for 
public education, it has neither mandated nor provided incentives for school 
desegregation. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Obama 
administration’s stimulus package) set aside a $650 million Innovation Fund for schools 
that closed achievement gaps. But to that end, the Department of Education has called for 
the expansion of charter schools and has advocated for such programs as the Harlem 
Children’s Zone, which provides preschool and enrichment programs for students in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Whether either model is effective is unclear. Programs like 
Harlem’s Children Zone have demonstrated real gains at the preschool level, but have 
proven far less effective for middle and high school students. And both initiatives 
reinforce patterns of educational segregation, rather than providing resources to pro-
integrative programs that demonstrably improve educational outcomes.³⁷

   Educational inequality and housing inequality have long been intertwined because 
of educational localism in the United States. Wealthy communities have long benefited 
from well-funded schools; poorer and racially segregated communities have been 
burdened with second-class education. The Obama administration’s urban and 
metropolitan initiatives--especially its programs to mitigate the impact of predatory 
lending, to expand the construction of affordable housing, and to open long-segregated 
suburban housing markets--have been limited so far, but have the potential to address 
structural inequalities head-on. Obama’s pledge to create a comprehensive urban policy 
promises to reverse the course of the last three decades. The administration’s ongoing
support of the development of mixed-income housing projects in place of large-scale public housing developments might please some integrationist planners (and likewise alienate community control advocates who want to improve rather than demolish affordable housing projects and who worry about a loss of community in impoverished neighborhoods. But federal efforts to replace public housing with market-rate and mixed-income public-private developments--an especially important policy since the Clinton years--have often displaced low-income housing residents without meeting the enormous demand for affordable housing, especially in expensive metropolitan areas. And critics of Obama’s urban policy heads, Adolfo Carrion, Derek Douglas, and Sean Donovan, have criticized their efforts to construct market-rate housing as exacerbating the housing shortage for the working poor and minorities.38

In the meantime, the administration has also continued to support both public-private partnerships and non-for-profit housing, education, and urban redevelopment initiatives. Whether those programs will “gild the ghetto” as integrationist planners would have charged, or empower the power as community control advocates hoped, remains to be seen. Most likely they will continue on a scale that resists aggregation and wide scale replication. On the other side, Obama’s urban policy team continues to support regionalism in principle—drawing especially from the scholarship of Brookings Institution scholars. But in the current political climate, building political will for regional solutions remains extraordinarily difficult. It requires collaboration, including revenue sharing, across municipal boundaries. It requires breaching the very high governmental barriers that separate municipalities from each other. Regionalism is not a short-term solution to the problem of spatial inequity--but it is a necessary first step. Obama’s
rhetoric of unbounded community--his call to think outside the boundaries of narrow identity politics and self-interest--offers a challenge to some of the most poisonous manifestations of our bounded communities. In both policy and rhetoric, the new administration can challenge the “us versus them”?“city versus suburbs” ethos that reinforces racial, educational, and economic inequality in the United States. But the lack of incentives to local and state governments—a problem that has especially afflicted places like metropolitan St. Louis and Ferguson—to pursue regional solutions may prove an insuperable obstacle to enduring change. The burden of the last half-century of urban planning—of community control and its alternatives—continues to weigh heavily on the Obama administration. It may well be that the deep-rooted structures of localism and legacy of the debates about it in the decades following the 1960s matters more to the fate of urban policy than any efforts to reorganize the executive branch. Or maybe the Obama administration will find a balance between the demands of integration and community and do what most administrations do, which is to make changes on the margins but in ways that might gradually change the arc of policy. That remains to be seen.
NOTES

1 Executive Order 13,509, 74 Federal Register 8139, February 19, 2009. For details on the staff, programs, and initiatives of the White House Office of Urban Affairs, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/oua


3 My approach to policy and history is shaped by the work of scholars of American political development. The best summary can be found in Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge, 2004).


6 Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999), esp. ch 5. In addition to works cited in note 4, see Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl, eds., Urban Policy in Twentieth Century America (New Brunswick, 1993); Bruce A. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt (Oxford, 1991); Jon Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance (Baltimore, 1990).

On black politics in the 50s, see Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North* (New York, 2008); and consult the classic, James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (Glencoe, IL, 1960)


19 Wendell Pritchett, Robert Clifton Weaver and the American City: The Life and Times of an Urban Reformer (Chicago, 2008) offers the best history of HUD’s early years.

20 There is, shockingly, no modern history of Model Cities. My material draws from a number of monographs and from my reading of Johnson administration materials. The best overview of the Model City program remains Charles M. Haar, Between the Idea and the Reality: A Study in the Origin, Fate, and Legacy of the Model Cities Program (Boston, 1975).


For an excellent discussion of CDCs written at the time, see Geoffrey Faux, CDCs: New Hope for the Inner City (New York, 1971) and the useful essays in Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens, eds., Urban Problems and Community Development (Washington, DC, 1999). For a more recent favorable appraisal, see Alexander von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of America’s Urban Neighborhoods (Oxford University Press, 2003); and von Hoffmann, Fuel Lines for the Urban Revival Engine: Neighborhoods, Community Development Corporations, and Financial Intermediaries (Washington, DC, 2001).


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