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Editor's Note

We at the editorial board wish to welcome you to Janus, the undergraduate journal for history and the humanities at the University of Maryland, College Park. We seek to grant undergraduate students a voice in the academic world by providing them a chance to publish their work and to participate formally in scholarly debate.

Our journal's namesake, Janus is a two-headed god of Roman mythology who looks forwards and backwards. He is older than the calendar and precedes the chief god of the Roman Pantheon, Jupiter. Janus is unique among Roman gods with his two heads, allowing him to look both inside and outside, forward and backward. Following the path of time, Janus looks to the beginning and to the end, to the past and to the future. Janus is the passing of space and time.

His duality mirrors historical inquiry, studying the past with the wisdom of the present.

Janus was created in the fall of 2000 by a group of undergraduate history students at the University of Maryland. Traditionally, Janus has followed the example of professional academic journals, featuring traditional thesis-driven student papers.

After a lapse in publishing in the last few years, a new team of editors has a vision for Janus. Considering the past in our vision for the future, we plan to publish an online traditional journal at the end of every Fall and Spring semester, and to begin to feature the best papers from the required HIST 208 and 408 research seminars. Furthermore, we plan to create and maintain a new online, more irreverent presence with current news articles, short history papers, thought-provoking pieces, interviews from the department, and more, that will evolve as the next semester continues.

Looking back at the high-caliber publications preceding us and preparing for the semester ahead of us, we invite you to join Janus as we consider the past with an eye on the future.

Sincerely,
The Editorial Board

Efforts Of The Biracial Community To Change The 2000 Census

By Amina Manguera

Biracial Americans have come a long way over the last half-century in regards to identification on the Census. The American Heritage Dictionary defines biracialism as “having parents of two different races.”ⁱ America currently has a biracial president and multiple actors, professional athletes, and average citizens all over the country proudly identify as biracial. Most importantly, as of 2000, individuals can now “mark one or more boxes” on the Census and other government forms.ⁱⁱ Americans of different multiracial backgrounds joined together and worked towards a day where they would be able to identify as they wanted. The goal was to create a multiracial box on the Census.

Actions of individuals and groups across the country paved the way for future mixed race generations by working towards changing the Census. Some claim that the 2000 Census only changed because the government needed to more accurately capture minority population counts to better distribute funding. Multiple factors influenced the change of instructions on the Census’s race classification. Although some Americans believe that the adding of multiracial options on the Census had little to do with the biracial community, the biracial community’s continuous efforts across the country prove that they were the driving force that changed the 2000 Census. The efforts and influences of the biracial community through the growth in number of biracial Americans, individuals identifying as “Other”, mixed race celebrities in popular culture, and social movements created a time of self-awareness that led to the change of race acknowledgment on the 2000 Census. The restlessness of supporters made it so that it was only a matter of time for the biracial community to be seen as a separate race from their single-race parents.

In 1998, Kathleen Odell Korgen, author of “From Black to Biracial: Transforming Racial Identity Among Americans,” recognized the future of the biracial community, believing that “as increasing numbers of interracial parents and their offspring advocate a multiracial category on racial classification forms, ... there is a strong possibility that a multiracial box will be added to the 2000 Census.”ⁱⁱⁱ Another supporter of the claim regarding the biracial community’s impact and author of “Mark One or More”, Kim Williams, adds, “the multiracial movement is best known for its advocates’ efforts to add a multiracial category to the 2000 Census.”^{iv} Eric Bailey, author of “The New Face of America,” supports the argument that the government needed to update the Census to better capture America’s minority population. Bailey observes, “from the federal government’s perspective, it is vital to know which segments of the US population are underserved, underrepresented, or overrepresented...these critical sociodemographic data sets on specific groups of populations help to guide local and national government policies and programs.”^v

The United States has used the Census since 1790 to collect demographic data for funding distributions across the country. The Census Bureau was put under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903, and later the Department of Commerce when Labor broke off, so the Bureau itself has no power to change without approval from the Department of Commerce.^{vi} The Office of Management and Budget uses the Census data to determine budgets and make sure that the Civil Rights Act is being abided by.^{vii} A section on the Census asks about race, with classifications that have changed over the years. In 1790, there were three options: “Free White Male”, “Free White Female” and “Slave”. Once slavery was abolished, the Census continued to track citizen’s ancestry by applying the “one drop rule”, the

idea that someone was considered black if they had “one drop” of black ancestry in their blood. In 1850, the Census used “White”, “Black” and “Mulatto”. From 1890 to 1930 the Census used the terms “Mulatto”, “Quadroon”, and “Octoroon” to follow one’s black ancestry down to the eighth. In 1930, the classification went to the term of the time, Negro, until 1970 when black and Negro, which are both intended to label those of African descent, were put back on.^{viii} In 2000, “African American” was added as a classification for the black community.^{ix}

The Census Bureau gradually added race classification options for other minority groups. For example, in 1860 categories acknowledging the Asian and Native Indian population were added; in 1960, Hawaiian was added, followed by Latino in 1970.^x “Other” was on the first Census to categorize everyone that was not white or a slave; it was then taken off in 1840 and re-added in 1910 to only be taken off again in 1960, returning indefinitely in 1970.^{xi} The Census classifications changed with the time and adapted to represent the growing diversity of the country, however, the Census did not keep up with the biracial community.

In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement was at its peak; it was a time when blacks were fighting for their rights and acknowledgement in their own country. Identity weighs heavily on race and ancestral background, so the right to self-identify race became increasingly important for Americans throughout the post-civil rights era in America. In 1896, the Supreme Court case of *Plessy v. Ferguson* shed light on the one-drop rule in America so that if a person was the slightest fraction of black then that is how society should recognize him or her.^{xii} Homer Plessy was not allowed to ride the train car marked as white because even though he could pass as white, he had a drop of black in his blood, which meant he was black. This led to the “separate but equal” practice that resulted in segregation. People like Plessy were classified as black even if it was not apparent, so his case highlighted what classified people as black during this time in America. The one-drop rule followed a person’s black ancestry and restricted a person’s ability to self-identify as mixed or white.

Shortly after the desegregation of the country, the *Loving v. Virginia* court case in 1967 concluded that the ban on interracial marriage was unconstitutional.^{xiii} Mixed race couples and biracial children still existed despite the law, but a spike in the number of biracial children followed the legalization of interracial marriage in the country.^{xiv} Considering that the children born in the 1970s and 1980s were too young to fill out the Census during those decades, this large number of young biracial Americans had to pick a racial identity around the 1990s. When it was their turn to fill out the Census, “the number of ‘mixed-race’ births [has] grown 26 times faster than all U.S. births.”^{xv} This is a direct result of the increase in interracial marriages; “the number of children in interracial families grew from less than one-half million in 1970 to about two million in 1990.”^{xvi} Biracial identity also causes the confusion in racial classification because appearance is a strong factor in identity. America’s biracial community has had a long and complicated history with identification in society. Being made up of more than one race, but being expected to identify as a singular race, caused frustration among many people. Adding a multiracial box to the 2000 Census was very important to many biracial Americans, so they used their resources to reach their goal.

First, the growing numbers of the biracial community played a significant role in the additional options on the form of the 2000 Census. According to the Census Bureau, interracial marriages grew from 676,000 to over 3 million from 1970 to 1994.^{xvii} Black and white marriages went from 1.7% of mixed marriages in 1960 to 6% in 1990.^{xviii} While white and American Indian adults made up 50% of the multiracial community, the black and white adults made up 12% but are highlighted in society partly because the black community has the lowest rate of marrying

outside of their race.^{xix} Today, 46% of multiracial Americans are children, and of those children, 36% are a mix of black and white parents.^{xx} However, while the biracial community was growing exponentially, racial identification on government forms was at a standstill. Identifying in a mono-racial society proved to be difficult for multiracial Americans, in part because racial identity has become flexible over the years, making it impossible to accurately fill out a Census before 2000. Sociologist Ronald Hall explains how race has been seen as a fluid concept, and among the biracial community, identity often changes with the time.

To be biracial in America requires/enables living a life of multiple identities... On the one hand, it may precipitate a conscious distancing from the stigmatized race category. On the other hand, it may involve the creation of a new identity based in part upon an inability to be accepted without reservation by Euro and/or African Americans. That inability demands identity diffusion in the traditional Eriksonian sense; at the same time, a biracial life may exemplify the functional identity of a "black" or "white" American. Dependent upon skin color, identity is in fact fluid.^{xxi}

Many biracial Americans grew up with singular racial categories, and then as society changed and the biracial community grew, they altered their identity to embrace the multiple aspects of their background because, as Hall demonstrates, biracial identity is bound to change over one's lifetime. Developing one's identity could have been a factor that expanded the biracial community on paper, which is significant because it shows society straying away from pigeonholing an individual of more than one race into a single race. This causes identity confusion for the rest of his or her life. As hard as it is to singularly identify someone that is mixed, it is equally as hard to categorize race based on skin color. Biracial people come in a wide range of skin complexions and that depends on their parent's genes. For instance, biracial people, even siblings with the same parents, may be born darker and therefore, would not give a hint that they are biracial; yet others may be born lighter and by the way they look, can give the impression that they are mixed. Biracial Americans proved that the frustration involved with racial identity was becoming more of a pressing issue through their use of the "Other" option on the 1990 Census.^{xxii}

In addition, Americans who marked themselves as "Other" on the 1990 Census contributed to the change of the classification on the form. The Census' "Other" category had been added and taken away over the years leading up to the 1990 Census.^{xxiii} In 1980, only 3% of Americans marked their race as "Other", and the figure increased to 3.9%, or roughly 10 million^{xxiv}, in 1990. According to the Census Bureau, about 97% of the people that marked other in 1990 had a Hispanic background.^{xxv} In contrast, on the 2000 Census over 7 million Americans marked themselves as being one or more race, making up 2.58% of the U.S. population.^{xxvi}

Biracial Americans were forced to identify as the race society saw them, which resulted in a large number of Americans not picking a race and selecting "Other". Amy Argetsinger, writer for the Washington Post reported that, "in the past few years, many college officials say they've seen a striking surge in the number of applications from students... who conspicuously decline to state their race."^{xxvii} Argetsinger added that "this was the case at George Washington University, [where] more than 2,000 applicants skipped the ethnicity question this year (2003), 45 percent more than two years ago."^{xxviii} In other words, college students prior to 2000 added to the strong foundation of biracialism that encouraged the fight for the multiracial box to carry on. In fact, college students have always been influential in creating trends and social movements, as

it has been shown when it comes to racial identification. It was later confirmed that a number of applicants that did not check their race, did so because they did not feel comfortable limiting their multiracial backgrounds to one race on the forms.^{xxxix} In general, parents are the ones who identify their children on forms while they are growing up. However, sometimes parents of biracial children are put in a difficult position of having to choose their child's race. Most of the time, these parents go with "Other" because they do not have the option to pick two; therefore they have to limit their child to only one parent's identity. College is generally the time students discover their identity, so it is often the first time biracial children have to identify themselves on any official forms. Therefore, not indicating their race on college applications because of one's multiracial heritage makes sense for these students.

Furthermore, everyday biracial Americans had a large part to do with the push to update the 2000 Census, but biracial celebrities had an equally influential part in this movement. Biracial celebrities were instrumental in changing the 2000 Census by normalizing mixed race people in popular culture. For instance, Tiger Woods and other popular culture celebrities influenced many Americans to embrace their biracialism. Indeed, Tiger Woods had his fair share of influence on the biracial community during the 1990s, when he won his first Masters on April 13, 1997, just ten days before Congress discussed racial categories on the upcoming 2000 Census.^{xxx} Because of this success, he took advantage of his appearance on The Oprah Winfrey Show to announce that he was not black, but actually Cablinasain (Caucasian, black, Indian, Asian).^{xxxi} Woods came up with this label while he was growing up, which he felt helped him embrace all parts of his background. Thus, being a public figure, and proud of his mixed heritage, Woods became the face of the growing multiracial community. Woods' contribution to the awareness of biracialism, prompted Ramona Douglass, the president of the Association of MultiEthnic Americans (AMEA), to comment, "whether he wants to or not, [Tiger Woods] is sort of becoming the poster person for multiracial identity."^{xxxii} As the country's popular example of biracial Americans struggling with identifying in a one-race society, Woods was referred to as an example during the U.S. Congressional hearing on the 2000 Census in 1997. America came to the realization that Tiger Woods was not black, but Cablinasain as a result of his relentless efforts to have people understand that he was not just one race. Being a public figure, he had the opportunity to challenge his identity publicly, which started a widespread revival of biracial identity. Many multiracial Americans were influenced by Woods' bold expression of his multi-cultural identity, and understood that it was time that they do the same. Woods' celebrity status helped him create a platform for the discussion of mixed race identity. Boldly correcting those who called him by one race, Tiger Woods opened the floor for many U.S. citizens to explore their backgrounds and identify with multiple races.

Biracial people other than Tiger Woods also played a crucial role in putting biracial Americans on their screens at home and in their magazines to make the community known and normalize it. Halle Berry, another important biracial figure, started acting in the early 1990s, and would eventually go on to be labeled as the first African American woman to win an Oscar, not ever mentioning she was biracial.^{xxxiii} Regardless, she has become a pioneer for women of color in the media and has done so as a biracial woman. Other actors also contributed to making biracial Americans mainstream. A Different World was a popular TV show in the 1990s that often talked about race in America, where biracialism was emphasized through the character Freddie, played by Cree Summer, who was a biracial character in the show attending a historically black university.^{xxxiv} In addition, Lisa Bonet, a multiracial American, was on both The Cosby Show and A Different World, continuing to put the biracial community in the public

eye and allowed the conversation to proceed about how to identify someone with a mixed background.^{xxxv} Her character was a cool college student that everyone wanted to be like, adding confidence to those her age to express their full racial identity.

Finally, many groups raised awareness about the need for added options on the Census for multiracial Americans. These groups include the Association of MultiEthnic Americans (AMEA) created in 1988 to “identify and legally eliminate discrimination against multiracial individuals and families.”^{xxxvi} The mission of AMEA was “to promote a positive awareness of interracial and multiethnic identity, for ourselves and for society as a whole.”^{xxxvii} To underscore the need to recognize multiracial Americans, AMEA created local groups, such as the Biracial Family Network. These local groups worked on “institution building, letter writing, demonstrations, lobbying, groups, [and] websites” that kept the conversation going about identification on the 2000 Census by putting the issue in the public eye.

Susan Graham of Georgia, a white mother of a biracial child and the founder of Project RACE was not sure how to classify her child on the 1990 Census. When she called the Census Bureau to inquire about how to identify her child, the officials told her to put down her race, which was white. However, Graham felt uncomfortable with identifying her child’s race as “White” or “Other” on the form. This uneasiness was the reason she created Project RACE (Reclassifying All Children Equally) whose goal was to lobby state legislatures to change the federal government’s lack of acknowledgement of the biracial community. Adding a multiracial box on the Census was a major goal, as that was the ultimate form to recognize the multiracial community.^{xxxviii} As a result of her team lobbying, beginning in 1992, several states added multiracial categories on their state government forms.^{xxxix} Another group, A Place For Us (APFU) which was created by Ruth and Steve White (an interracial couple), fought hard for the recognition of biracial Americans and mixed marriages. As an interracial couple, they tried to get married in 1986 but their minister would not marry them so they created APFU.^{xl} This group “began to provide counseling services, to perform marriages, to organize workshops, and to coordinate Bible studies for interracial Christian couples in Southern California.”^{xli} This interracial couple was among the many supporters of mixed race couples in their community, which directly affects their children who were a part of the biracial community. Marches and displays of frustration across the country created a spotlight on the efforts multiracial Americans were making to have an added box. The largest march of the movement was the Multiracial Solidarity March on July 20, 1996 which was an important event that fueled this movement, gathering thousands of multiracial Americans on the National Mall in Washington DC.^{xlii} Supporters gathered to embrace their multiracial make-up and add to the efforts to add a multiracial box on the 2000 Census.

However, many people have argued that the biracial community did not play a significant role in the change of classifications on the 2000 Census. They claim that the Census solely altered the form because it needed to update population counts to accurately distribute funding. Sampling, a technique the Census used to gather population counts by estimating, was used on the 1990 Census and resulted in a significant undercount of minorities. This sizeable undercount was a result of the increasing amount of people marking themselves as “Other”, taking them out of a minority category, which directly affected federal funding. Washington Post writer Barbara Vobejda reported that “each year, nearly \$200 billion in federal funds for various programs [are] distributed on the basis of Census figures.” She added that “the programs whose fundings [are] affected include Medicaid and education aid.”^{xliii} Loss of funding for programs that benefit minorities “was due to a large undercount of the population on the 1990 Census

where over eight million people were not counted, a majority of them being minorities.^{xliv} Steven Holmes argues that this “led to a push, particularly by major cities that lost millions in federal aid, to adjust the 1990 Census.”^{xlv}

With the fear of repeating the mistakes of the 1990 Census, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was hesitant to create a “multiracial” category on the Census, believing that people would confuse ethnicity with race and categorize themselves as multiracial when in fact they were not, but actually multiethnic.^{xlvi} The OMB also claimed that a broad multiracial category would place people of different mixed races together, not giving the Bureau a detailed layout of the population. Although these arguments may have some validity to them, the biracial community weighed heavily on the changes of the 2000 Census. Without the biracial community identifying as “Other”, the OMB would not have seen the large growth of the biracial community in the decades prior to 2000. Furthermore, if the biracial community went the easy route and marked themselves as one race, there would not have been a loss in funding. Even if it is not apparent to some, multiracial Americans were the underlying force that pushed this movement from the beginning to its grand finale.

The 2000 Census would not have improved the classifications if it were not for the vision of the biracial community that stepped in to express their identity. With the growth of the biracial community and the influence of celebrities’ relentless efforts to have their full identity recognized, being biracial started a discussion nationwide. Continuing the conversation, millions of multiracial Americans participated in marches, lobbying, or *simply* marked “Other” on their government forms to normalize biracialism. These actions that seemed small happened all across the country and created a red flag that was a force to be reckoned with until change happened. As a result of this movement, the 2000 Census gave Americans the option to “mark one or more boxes.” This option is proving to be better than a broad multiracial box because it allows those filling the form out to be specific about their mixed background. While multiracial Americans did not get the multiracial box they were originally fighting for, they helped America get one step closer to identifying multiracial people on all forms throughout the country.

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ⁱ American Heritage Dictionary, vol 4 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015)

ⁱⁱ The Census Bureau's "We the People of More Than One Race in the United States" Special Report highlights the use of the "mark one or more boxes" option on the 2000 Census.

ⁱⁱⁱ Kathleen Odell Korgen, *From Black to Biracial: Transforming Racial Identity Among Americans* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 95.

^{iv} Kim M. Williams, *Mark one or more: civil rights in multiracial America*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 2.

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^{vi} Kim M. Williams, *Mark one or more: civil rights in multiracial America*, 17

^{vii} Ibid.

^{viii} Laris Karklis and Emily Badger, "Every term the Census has used to describe America's racial and ethnic groups since 1790," *Washington Post*, November 4, 2015, accessed November 5, 2015,

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^{ix} Ibid

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^{xvii} Fletcher, "Tiger Woods Says He's Not Just Black," *The Seattle Times*, April 23, 1997.

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^{xix} Ibid

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- ^{xli} Ibid, 11.
- ^{xlii} Michael Marriott, “Multiracial Americans Ready to Claim Their Own Identity” *New York Times*, July 20, 1996, accessed November 10, 2015
<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/20/us/multiracial-americans-ready-to-claim-their-own-identity.html?pagewanted=all>
- ^{xliii} Barbara Vobejda, “Adjusted Census To Slightly Alter Federal Funding,” *Washington Post*, March 3, 1999.
- ^{xliv} Steven. A Holmes, “After Standing Up to Be Counted, Americans Number 281,421,906,” *New York Times*, Dec 29, 2000.
- ^{xlvi} According to New Oxford’s American Dictionary, ethnicity means “belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition as opposed to multiracial. For example, someone from France is French so “French” would be his or her ethnicity. A multiethnic person can be one race.

Latin American Liberalism In Revolutionary Brazil

By Aaron Gladstone

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic world was on the precipice of great change. The American and French Revolutions, grounded in new Enlightenment concepts of rule of law, representative government, and personal freedom, unleashed a wave of new liberal ideas and revolutionary movements on Europe and their American colonies. Liberalism challenged the existing monarchical and mercantile traditions in Europe and European colonies.

These liberal ideas percolated down to social leaders who championed the common and marginalized people, from Haitian slaves to European creoles in Latin America. They ignited movements calling for independence and a new society across the South American continent that spurred independence from Europe. When forming these new societies, the new leaders had choices to make regarding the overarching ideology of the new government. In this era, the choice lay between the new themes of liberalism or the reactionary ideals of conservatism. Across the continent, the new nations struggled to balance these two opposing forces. In the unique case of Brazil, after the Portuguese Court fled Europe, these liberal movements successfully influenced the transplanted Court to sever its European ties and caused the ruling class to flee Brazil. Yet while the spirit of Brazilian independence and the Constitution of 1824 aimed to establish a European-style liberal government, various political, economic, and social forces, stemming from the old Portuguese elites, international forces, and the Brazilian upper class, caused a unique form of liberalism to arise in Brazil; one in which the liberal idea of constitutionalism and the conservative idea of slavery could coexist.

For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, scholars did not have a clear understanding of Brazilian independence. To understand the historiography of Brazilian Independence, one must be aware of the mythification of Brazilian independence. In order to understand Brazilian independence, one must rely on the scholarly research of Brazilian historians. For much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Brazilian historians relied on “legends and myths” instead of “erudition and scientific scholarship” as the foundation for historical research.¹ As such, much of the founding scholarship derives from misunderstood or fabricated history. However, in the mid-1900s, there was a rebirth of Brazilian scholarship that challenged the prevailing notions of Brazilian independence. By putting Brazilian Independence in a global historical context, including context from the global industrial revolution and criticisms of the colonial system as a whole, historians could more accurately depict, understand, and analyze this historic event.² These changes allowed researchers to ask new questions regarding the classes of Brazil and the European influence and reaction to Brazilian independence. In this new era of scholarship, historians reframed the account of Brazilian Independence. They took into account the emerging capitalistic tensions between Europe and Latin America, the economic development of Brazil, the industrial revolution, and European liberalism.³

It is within this context that this scholarship will emerge. By utilizing the new English sources as novel viewpoints and comparing the more scholarly works to the established myths,

¹ Emília Viotti Da Costa, “The Political Emancipation of Brazil,” *In From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil*, ed. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, 43-88 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 43,

² *Ibid.*, 44.

³ *Ibid.*

this scholarship will paint a clearer picture of Brazilian independence, including foreign reactions. Comparing the myths to the scholastic historical research, this scholarship will be able to understand why the founders who purported these stories did so, and why these stories served a long-standing greater national purpose.

When discussing independence, it is necessary to parse the different forces that cause a separation. One such force is political emancipation: what were the changing political dynamics between the colony and the mother country? Another force is economic divergence: how did the economies and economic interests of the colony and mother country diverge? Lastly, social disjunction: how did the two societies in question grow apart?

The politics of Brazilian independence offer a classic case study of the conflict between new liberalism and traditional monarchism within the context of both a fledgling Latin American state and an old European kingdom. This is evident in the struggle for increased political participation yet the insistence of the continuance of slavery.

On April 26, 1820, Dom João VI, the king of Portugal, fleeing the armies of Napoleon, set sail from Brazil to Portugal and told his son, Dom Pedro I that he ought to “place the Crown on thine own head, rather than allow it to fall into the hands of any adventurer!”⁴ Just two years later, on September 7, Dom Pedro, on the bank of the Ypiranga River, just outside of San Paulo, “complied with...the warmest wish of every enlightened Brazilian”⁵ and formally declared, “Brazil forevermore separated from Portugal”⁶ and proclaimed himself the first Emperor of Brazil. Brazilians had wanted independence since the arrival of the Portuguese King and Court in 1808. The King, Dom João, however, brought more than his Court to Brazil; he also brought liberalism and change. In this proclamation, the uniqueness of Brazilian liberalism is evident as the “enlightened Brazilians” called for an imperial monarchy.

When Dom João VI transferred the government across the Atlantic, he needed to Europeanize his new home.⁷ In doing so, he removed the structural barriers that had kept Brazil a colony and elevated it to a kingdom, with Rio de Janeiro as its glorious capital.⁸ However, Dom João VI’s commitment to protecting Portuguese interests prevented Brazil from reaching its full potential.⁹ Dom João VI’s persistent conflict between favoring Portugal and uplifting Brazil caused tensions between the transported Court and the Brazilian elite class. As a way to mitigate these escalating tensions, Dom João VI left Brazil to return to Portugal, which in turn paved the way to independence.

Dom Pedro I understood that his new Brazil would need a written constitution to placate the Brazilian leaders that had forced his father to leave the continent. As such, he called a national assembly that spent the year of 1823 constructing the new constitution.¹⁰ The

⁴ John Armitage, *A History of Brazil: From the Period of the Arrival of the Braganza Family in 1808, to the Abdication of Don Pedro the First in 1831, Volumes 1* (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1836), 36.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁶ Don Pedro I, “Declaration of Brazilian Independence, 1822,” in *The Brazil Reader*, ed. Robert M Levine, & John J Crocitti (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 63-64.

⁷ Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821 (New World in the Atlantic World)*, (Psychology Press, 2001), 87.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁹ Da Costa, “The Political Emancipation of Brazil,” 52.

¹⁰ George A Glynn, *Foreign Constitutions* (Albany: The Argus Company, 1894), 62.

Constitution of 1824 drew inspiration from the liberal ideas of France and America. By formally creating a constitutional document, Brazilians established the liberal idea of the rule of law; they enacted a social contract, which bound all citizens. The Constitution included separate branches of government, each with their own specific powers.¹¹ It established a representative government, with an elected bicameral legislature.¹² Furthermore, it guaranteed all Brazilian citizens certain rights, including religious freedom, the right to due process, and the freedom of speech and press.¹³ Both Brazilians and foreigners hailed this constitution and new country as a success.¹⁴ John Armitage, a British citizen who travelled to Brazil and lived there for most of the revolutionary period, called it “far more liberal in its disposition than the character of its compliers had led the public to anticipate,” and praised its usage of existing European models for liberalism.¹⁵

While liberal ideas were espoused throughout the document, in reality, the government created reflected the needs of the conservative upper class and did little reduce the strife of the marginalized groups of Brazilian society.¹⁶ It established an imperial, hereditary, monarchy headed by the son of a European dictator.¹⁷ The Emperor had great personal power, including the ability to dissolve the legislature at will.¹⁸ The Constitution narrowly defined voting rights and legislators served life terms.¹⁹ While the document did guarantee some personal freedoms, it did not mention slavery, and as such, slave masters retained total authority over their slaves, which is perhaps the most at odds with the liberal goal of the document.²⁰

These aspects of the Constitution suggest that European liberalism had not found a new home in Latin American, but rather Brazil had etched out its own form of liberalism. As with other American revolutions, the ousting of a European power did not free the new country from aristocracy or despotism, rather it transferred the power from one distant political elite to local political elite.²¹ This transfer did not mitigate all of the liberal ideas sought after by the revolutionaries, but it does suggest that conservatism was a powerful political force in the newly independent Brazil. Therefore, one can conclude that liberalism does not operate in a vacuum, but rather competes with many other ideologies.

Conservatism gained a foothold in the new Empire for two specific reasons, vestigial Portuguese influence, and the existing power structure. Despite the break between the two countries, Portuguese royal advisors and military officials populated much of Dom Pedro I’s new government.²² As Dom Pedro I assumed more and more autonomous power, aided by those Portuguese as well as Brazilian ultra-royalists, he became increasingly more involved in the

¹¹ *Constitución Política de 1824*. Art. 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, Art. 1 Sec. 16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Art. 4 Sec 2. Cl. 72.

¹⁴ Glynn, *Foreign Constitutions*, 62; Maria Graham, *Journal of a voyage to Brazil : and residence there during part of the years 1821, 1822, 1823* (London : Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1824).

¹⁵ Armitage, *A History of Brazil*, 154.

¹⁶ Da Costa, “The Political Emancipation of Brazil,” 88.

¹⁷ *Constitución Política de 1824*. Art. 1 Sec. 3.

¹⁸ Haring, *Empire in Brazil*, 29.

¹⁹ *Constitución Política de 1824*. 1824 Art 1 Sec 2.

²⁰ Da Costa, “The Political Emancipation of Brazil,” 88.

²¹ Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1985).

²² Haring, *Empire in Brazil*, 31.

internal affairs of Portugal, including crises in Portuguese royal succession.²³ This combination of events, the involvement with Portugal, and the assuming of more power, directly undercut the liberalism of 1824. Dom Pedro I did not convene the National Assembly until 1826 and rarely consulted them or heeded their actions.²⁴ He was largely able to undercut the liberal ideas of the 1824 Constitution because of the existing Brazilian power structure. Even as a colony, there were seemingly two Brazils, the upper wealthy classes, and the poorer, marginalized classes. While both groups sought independence, the wealthy class gave Dom Pedro I the necessary clout to establish a new government; in return for their political support, Dom Pedro I did not intrude on their economic wellbeing or social status, in spite of the new Constitution.²⁵ However, the evolving conservative nature of the new government had one positive consequence for the new country: it helped solidify its status among the international community.²⁶

While political conservatism gained a strong foothold in Brazil following the ratification of the 1824 Constitution, it did not extinguish the spark of liberalism that had ignited the earlier, more radical of independence movements. Despite its shortcomings, Brazil had successfully created a written Constitution that set the basis of day-to-day governance and gave a fledgling Latin American colony the chance to achieve its potential. However, while political emancipation is an important aspect of any independence movement, it is not the sole force. Another force needed for independence is economic divergence. Economic divergence played a large role in the independence of Brazil as Brazilians sought to end what they viewed as a toxic and abusive economic relationship between Brazil and Portugal.

Before the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Latin America, Brazil, like much of Spanish and Portuguese American, existed under a mercantile system. Mercantilism dictated that, through colonies, mother countries could achieve economic growth.²⁷ However to achieve this growth, mother countries had to greatly restrict the economies of their colonies. These restrictions generally include strict trade laws, limitations on production, high tariffs, and large government-run monopolies.²⁸ Colonial merchants and traders across the continent had often criticized these restrictions and the Brazilians were no different; they had long sought economic relief from Portuguese policies.²⁹

Criticisms of mercantilism often stemmed from Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, which rejected the tenets of mercantilism and argued for the economic system of capitalism. Capitalism challenged mercantilism's notions of wealth and trade and argued for lower barriers to trade and the elimination of monopolies.³⁰ As these new economic ideas traversed enlightened Europe, they found a home in the Latin American colonies. The new idea of capitalism gave a voice to the economically suppressed Brazilian non-landed elites. When Dom João VI transferred his court in 1808, he was greeted by a Brazil that had been hostile to his economic policies. As a result, one of the first actions taken by Dom João VI in Brazil was to

²³ Ibid., 32-33.

²⁴ Ibid., 30.

²⁵ Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire*, 23.

²⁶ Graham. *Journal of a voyage to Brazil*.

²⁷ Laura LaHaye, "Mercantilism," *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, accessed November 15, 2015, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Da Costa, "The Political Emancipation of Brazil," 50.

³⁰ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776).

open the ports to foreign trade.³¹ However, Dom João VI faced pressure from the Portuguese to protect their economic interests; he acquiesced to their demands by limiting Brazilian trade.³² As a result, the merchant class of Brazil – those who suffered most directly from limited trade – called for independence.

Promises of a liberal economy stirred support for independence outside of Brazil as well. Great Britain had long been interested in expanding trade with the Americas, especially Brazil. Moreover, Brazil was eager to develop trade relations with Great Britain. When the cause for independence seemed to stall, Great Britain reignited it by promising an economic relationship with Brazilian producers and offered military support during the brief war that broke out between Brazil and Portugal.³³

Aside from governmental support, private British citizens travelled to Brazil in order to examine economic prospects of the new country.³⁴ The promise of private trade was not only the impetus for independence, but also for a written constitution.³⁵ British merchants were wary of doing business with citizens of a country that did not follow the European, enlightened style of government. As such, Brazilian foreign ministers stationed in Great Britain promised to deliver a written Constitution to their British counterparts, before the National Assembly had passed the Constitution.³⁶

Perhaps the greatest influence Great Britain sought to exert over the Brazilian economy was the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. In her travel writings from the early 1820s, the British Maria Graham often writes about the evils of slavery, bemoaning how “such a traffic, such a practice as that of slavery, should exist.”³⁷ Her attitudes towards the “evils of slavery”³⁸ reflect that of Great Britain. The British abolition movement, after successfully abolishing the practice in their own country, pressured their government into promoting abolition across the globe, and specifically with their trade partners.³⁹

Great Britain’s motivations for abolition did not wholly stem from a want of racial harmony; rather, they viewed slavery as an economic hindrance to their goals in trans-Atlantic trade. Slavery represented a free source of labor with which Great Britain could not compete and it closed off other avenues of trade with the African continent.⁴⁰ As such, Great Britain had a vested interest in the cessation of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Latin American slavery.

Great Britain applied its economic and political pressure to Brazil regarding slavery. Great Britain refused to trade fully with Brazil and one foreign minister declared, “No state in the New World will be recognized by Great Britain which has not frankly and completely abolished the trade in slaves.”⁴¹ However, the promise of new Latin American markets became

³¹ Da Costa, “The Political Emancipation of Brazil,” 51.

³² *Ibid.*, 58.

³³ Armitage, *A History of Brazil*, 96.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Preface,

³⁵ Leslie Bethell, “The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Anglo-Brazilian Relations, 1822-1826,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* (1969): 135.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 137.

³⁷ Graham, *Journal of a voyage to Brazil*.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Bethell, “The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade,” 115.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 115-116.

⁴¹ Canning to Wellington, no. 4, 27 Sept. 1822, printed in Webster, *op. cit.*, In, 74.

too alluring to British merchants and special interests. In March of 1826, the two nations signed the Anglo-Brazilian Anti-Slave Trade Treaty. This treaty formalized Great Britain's recognition of Brazil as a wholly independent nation, but declared that the Brazil could not import more slaves after three years of the ratification of the treaty,⁴² a remarkably different standard than the one outlined by the minister just four years before its ratification.

While the treaty formally outlawed the slave trade by 1830, it was not enforced, so the trade continued until 1850. Brazilian landowners continued to import African slaves – peaking with 60,000 slaves in the year 1848 alone – for 20 years after the ratification, in spite of British pressure to end the practice.⁴³

Both internal and external economic forces drove Brazil away from Portugal. Liberal ideas of capitalism, coming from aggrieved Brazilian merchants and an expansive British trade policy made the connection between Portugal and Brazil untenable. However, despite intense pressure from England, the complete liberalization of the economy of Brazil was inhibited by the continued reliance on slave labor. Once again, the liberalism of Brazil was not European, but rather a new, Latin American form.

While political developments and economic restrictions contributed to the unsustainable relationship between Portugal and Brazil, the societies of the two countries had grown apart and faced new and different challenges. The ways that Brazil attempted to manage the different marginalized people reflect the new form of liberalism that emerged in Brazil.

In an ideologically pure, traditional, European, form of liberalism, the different races should have all been treated equally, such that the government treated all citizens equally and that citizenship was not exclusive. This was exemplified in the Napoleonic Code, which unambiguously declared, “every Frenchman shall enjoy civil rights,” and made the status of Frenchman easily attainable.⁴⁴ However, the new nation of Brazil struggled to find a place in society for the African slaves and Brazilian Indians. While ultimately the new government of Brazil did not greatly alleviate the lives of these two marginalized groups, the initial push for independence, and those who spearheaded it, intended for the new Brazil to adopt liberal racial policies.⁴⁵

One such man was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva. Born in 1763 and called the “Father of [Brazilian] Independence,⁴⁶” he came from an aristocratic Brazilian family, but lived in Europe during the late 1700s where he was exposed – and adopted – decidedly liberal viewpoints.⁴⁷ When he returned to Brazil in 1818, he established himself as a notable academic, and by 1820, called for independence.⁴⁸ During the tumultuous period between independence and the adoption of Constitution in 1824, Bonifácio established himself as vital member of the

⁴² Bethell, “The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade,” 145.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁴⁴ “French Civil Code,” Book 1, Title 1, Chapter 1, Article 8, *The Napoleon Series*, March 8, 1803, accessed November 16, 2015, http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/code/book1/c_title01.html#chapter1.

⁴⁵ Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire*, 42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

transitory government. It was during this time that he published very liberal plans for the Brazilian Indians⁴⁹ and the slaves.⁵⁰

Bonifácio's plan for the Brazilian Indians outlined forty-four policy recommendations for the new government and included provisions for more community outreach, peaceful coexistence, warnings against forced conversions and intensive farm labor, and the entrustment of local government to existing tribal power structures.⁵¹ These ideas reflected Bonifácio's view that the Brazilian Indians were not subhuman or inherently inferior, but rather the idea that they were equal people who ought to be exposed to European values.⁵² This policy ran against the traditional Portuguese model, which involved compelling Brazilian Indians into forced agriculture labor camps.⁵³

While Bonifácio took a strong position regarding Brazilian Indian policy, it pales in comparison to his position on slavery. During the National Assembly of 1823, which Dom Pedro I commissioned to write a constitution, Bonifácio boldly declared that "a liberal and lasting Constitution" could not exist in a country that was guilty of "*not doing unto others that which we do not wish done unto us* [emphasis original]."⁵⁴ He further claimed that slavery still existed in Brazil due to "blind greed" and that the continued African slave trade was disgraceful.⁵⁵ Despite his strong polemic, Bonifácio was a pragmatic man; he did not demand immediate emancipation and offered thirty-two articles that would govern emancipation and the reintegration of former slaves to normal life.⁵⁶

Once again, however, the liberalism of the independence movement faced resistance from the existing, conservative power structure. Unfortunately, unlike in the political or economic realm, most of the liberalism of the earlier independence movements was stripped by the formalization of the new Constitution and the new government. The liberal social aspects of the movements too greatly threatened the existing power structure that the conservatives relied upon for their own power, in both of the cases of the marginalized groups.

Regarding Brazilian Indians, the plan offered by Bonifácio cut too close to the issue of slavery for the upper class conservatives, and the new Constitution made no mention of the Brazilian Indians.⁵⁷ Because of the absence of Brazilian Indian policy in the Constitution of 1824, Dom Pedro assumed great personal power and discretion regarding policy. As a result, the attitude of the Brazilian government to Brazilian Indians was haphazard and inconsistent, resulting in little change of the condition of the Brazilian Indian. This lack of structured change

⁴⁹ Mathias C Kiemen, "The Status of the Indian in Brazil after 1820," *Academy of American Franciscan History* (1865): 263-273.

⁵⁰ José Bonifácio, "Perhaps No Nation Ever Sinned More against Humanity than Portugal," in *Children of God's Fire*, ed. Robert E Conrad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 418-427.

⁵¹ Bonifácio, *Plan for the Civilization of the Brazilian Indians*, (October 30, 1821).

⁵² George C. A. Bohrer, "Variant Versions of Jose Bonifacio's 'Plan for the Civilization of the Brazilian Indians,'" *The Americas* (1958): 302.

⁵³ Kiemen, "The Status of the Indian in Brazil after 1820," 263.

⁵⁴ Bonifácio, "Perhaps No Nation Ever Sinned More against Humanity than Portugal," 419.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 421.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 424-27.

⁵⁷ Kiemen, "The Status of the Indian in Brazil after 1820," 267.

had such a longstanding impact that even by 1963 the Brazilian Indians faced persecution and oppression.⁵⁸

Bonifácio's call for abolition similarly went unheard. His plans offered to the National Assembly were, in fact, so radical, that after the dissolution of the Assembly, Dom Pedro forced him into exile.⁵⁹ Despite his personal charisma and large populist following, Bonifácio had as much success at influencing Dom Pedro I's racial policy domestically as did as the British did internationally. The conservative landowners simply held too much sway over the new government and, given their wealth was tied to their slave-run plantations: any of slave policy faced insurmountable challenges.⁶⁰ As a result, slavery remained a stain on Brazilian liberalism until 1888 with the adoption of the Golden Law, but, even then, the integration of former slaves to normal life was tumultuous.

The age of revolutions was perhaps the most tumultuous yet formative era for Latin America. It was in this time that the nations and peoples of Latin America forged their own identities. This self-identification was often tied to independence movements, as it was during this age that Latin America successfully separated itself from Europe. These independence movements were ideologically driven, and many revolutionaries sought to install a more liberal regime in their home countries. However, these liberal revolutionaries were not greeted with universal acclaim; conservatives challenged their ideas. This contest between liberalism and conservatism led to a system of mixed ideologies.

In all three branches of separation, political, economic, and social, the European liberalism of early supporters of independence, such as José Bonifácio, was tempered by a conservative backlash originating from the wealthy landowners and Dom Pedro I. While some liberal aspects of government, such as a written constitution and a basic form of representative government, economic ideas, such as capitalism and low barriers to trade, survived the backlash, the social goals of the early independence movements largely succumbed to conservative institutions. This combining of a moderately liberal government and economy with very conservative racial institutions resulted in a form of liberalism unseen in Europe and unique to Brazil.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 273.

⁵⁹ Bonifácio, "Perhaps No Nation Ever Sinned More against Humanity than Portugal," 418.

⁶⁰ Editorial to *Diario do Governo*, "A Defense of the Slave Trade in Response to British-Inspired Abolitionism," in *Children of God's Fire*, ed. Robert E Conrad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 427-430.

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**Early Palestinian Zionists And The Arab Question: Inclusion Or Exclusion In A
Jewish Society
By David Malamud**

When exploring early Zionism (1882-1917) and the Arab Question,¹ many scholars focus on famous European Zionist idealists; they explore the utopia of Theodore Herzl's *Altneuland* and they heed the warning of Ahad Ha'am's "A Truth from Eretz Yisrael."² In addition, many of these scholars, including Neville J. Mandel's *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*, focus mainly on European Zionists, with the exception of Rafael Medoff's *Zionism and the Arabs: An American Jewish dilemma, 1898-1948*, which focuses on American Zionists.³ This is problematic because, with the exception of Ha'am, European Zionists did not seem to approach Zionism as pragmatically as Zionists who dealt with their Arab neighbors daily.

However, Israel Kolatt deeply examines all Zionists and their relationship with the Arabs in his essay, "The Zionist Movement and the Arabs."⁴ Yosef Gorny's more extensive book, *Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948*, is an essential read that discusses both European Zionists and Palestinian⁵ Zionists and their relationships with Arabs because of his personal translations of over 150 Hebrew newspapers articles, speeches, and letters.⁶

While these are quintessential scholastic works to the study of Zionism and Arabs, especially Gorny and his assessment of primary Hebrew source material, they do not distinguish between Zionists of a particular region or ethnicity, but attempt to study all Zionists. While Michelle U. Campos's *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* is an exception, focusing only on Palestine, the breadth and focus of her book make her unable to present a detailed study of Zionism.⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to examine the less visible subset of Zionists, the Palestinian Zionists, and the Arab question.

Before exploring Palestinian Zionists opinions on the Arab question, it is important to define a few terms. With the advent of modern European anti-Semitism and

¹For the purposes of this essay, the term "Arabs" will generally refer to the ethnic group of the Middle East who speak Arabic and are not Jewish, while Jewish Arabs will be indicated as such. The "Arab Question" refers to the question of Arab inclusion in a Jewish society.

²Theodore Herzl, *Altneuland*, trans. Lotta Levensohn (New York: Bloch Pub. Co., 1941); Achad Ha-am, *Ten Essays on Zionism and Judaism*, trans. Leon Simon (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1992).

³Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Rafael Medoff, *Zionism and the Arabs: an American Jewish dilemma, 1898-1948* (Westport: Praeger, 1997).

⁴Israel Kolatt, "The Zionist Movement and the Arabs," in *Zionism and the Arabs*, ed. Shmuel Almog, trans. Avi Jacobsen (Jerusalem: The Historical Society of Israel and the Zalman Shazar Center, 1983).

⁵For this paper, "Palestine" will be used to describe the geographic region west of the river Jordan, occupied today by Israel and Palestine. While a loaded term today, the Ottoman Government (even though the territory was split into different provinces) referred to the land as "Arz-I Filistin," the Arabs referred to the land as "Filastin," and the Jews used "Palestine" as a translation of Eretz Yisrael and the name of their homeland.

⁶Yosef Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

⁷Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

the escalation of pogroms in the mid-nineteenth century, Moses Hess in his book, *Rome and Jerusalem*, and Leon Pinsker in his essay, “Auto-Emancipation,” both state that a return to Palestine is the only way to ensure Jewish safety from anti-Semitism.⁸ While Tzion is an ancient Hebrew word synonymous with Jerusalem, Nathan Birnbaum coined “Zionist” in April 1, 1890 and “Zionism” in May 16, 1890 in his periodical *Selbst-Emanzipation!*⁹ Nathan Birnbaum’s Zionism was a form of Jewish nationalism focused on uniting the diverse Jews in Eastern and Western Europe, a Zionism that inspired later cultural Zionism.¹⁰ Ahad Ha’am, the founder of cultural Zionism, later argues that Zionism can be achieved through a national spiritual center in a Palestine.¹¹

However, the “standard” Zionism of today, focused on a Jewish state in Palestine, is an outgrowth of Herzl’s political Zionism.¹² According to political Zionism, a Jewish state could be achieved through political negotiations with world powers.¹³ In contrast, Labor Zionism pursued the same goal through first creating a Jewish labor base in Palestine before proceeding with political negotiations.¹⁴

After the first modern wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the First Aliyah (literally translated “ascent,” but used to mean immigration to Israel), in 1882 and before the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, Zionists in the diaspora mainly ignored the relatively peaceful native Arab population of Palestine (with a few notable exceptions like Ahad Ha’am and Theodor Herzl), while Palestinian Zionists, many of whom interacted with Arabs daily, were more concerned about the Arab question. Among these Palestinian Zionists who lived alongside their Arab neighbors, the labor Zionists typically excluded Arabs while political and cultural Zionists included Arabs, as demonstrated through Zionist treatises, articles, addresses, and letters. To highlight the range of Zionist viewpoints, the paper will begin by analyzing the extreme exclusionists and conclude with extreme inclusionists.

In Ottoman ruled Palestine, from 1882-1903, Jewish immigration to Palestine escalated exponentially, constituting the First Aliyah.¹⁵ The Jewish immigrants were not uniform; they came from different ethnic groups and were compelled by different reasons.¹⁶ North Africans escaped French colonialism, Yemenites arrived with messianic furor, European religious Jews wanted to resettle the Holy Land, and European Zionists with more complex intentions.¹⁷ While Campos claims these European Zionists were motivated by “politics,” most of these immigrants were not political Zionists, arriving on the shores of Palestine to found a Jewish state: members of Hovevei/Hibbat Zion (Lovers

⁸ Moses Hess, *Rome to Jerusalem*, trans. Mayer Waxman (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1918); Leo Pinsker, “Auto-Emancipation,” trans. D. S. Blondheim (London : Association of Youth Zionist Societies, 1932).

⁹ Kalman Weiser and Joshua A. Fogel, *Czernowitz at 100* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 41.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹¹ Joshua A. Fishman, “Nathan Birnbaum’s *The Tasks of Eastern European Jews*,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 2014, no. 226 (February 18, 2014): 85.

¹² Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 84.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁵ Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*, 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

of Zion) and its fringe group of secular Marxist students, Bilu, were labor Zionists more interested in agricultural settlement.¹⁸

The Second Aliyah, from 1904-1906, was more homogeneous than the First Aliyah; comprised of Russian Labor Zionist idealists.¹⁹ While the land they were settling was not by any means empty, its native population is hard to quantify “because reliable statistics simply do not exist,” with population estimates ranging from five hundred thousand to almost seven hundred thousand for Palestine in the period of 1882-1917.²⁰ Among the older inhabitants of Palestine, there were traditional religious Jews, the Old Yishuv, who were often suspicious of these secular Zionists, demonstrating that conflict existed inside and outside the Palestinian Jewish community.²¹

Early labor Zionists in Palestine typically excluded their Arab neighbors, as demonstrated by two worker parties: the non-Marxist Hapoel Hatzair and the Marxist Poale Zion. Ze’ev Smilansky, the founder of Hapoel Hatzair, was an extreme exclusionist who argued that the Arabs did not make a nation and should not be aided in any way.²² However, this was not merely a personal opinion; the Hapoel Hatzair party as a whole advocated for “exclusive employment of Jewish workers,” justified through the belief that through labor, Zionism would be realized.²³ Famously, in 1912, in their party magazine of the same name, Hapoel Hatzair proclaimed, “an essential condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all the labour professions in Palestine by the Jews,” excluding Arab Palestinians from labor and therefore Jewish society.²⁴ Hapoel Hatzair could not reconcile their labor Zionism goal for “conquest of labor” with Arab Palestinian laborers so they excluded Palestinians from their society.

The Marxist Poale Zion also excluded Arabs from their burgeoning Jewish society. In 1906, Ber Borochov defined the views of Poale Zion in “Our Platform” where he states that Jews be in the “primary levels of production... to become free and not reliant on the proletariat of the neighboring peoples,” advocating for a homogeneously Jewish society.²⁵ While speaking in general terms, Borochov outlines a New Society where Jews are independent of other people and nations, including Arabs. After the 1908 revolution in Turkey that stirred Arab nationalist sentiments, that October, fellow member Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Zion discussed the Arabs as a cohesive national group and “rival claimants to the Palestine,” implying their existence and labor is a challenge to Jewish labor, forcing Poale Zion’s hand in excluding the Arab agricultural workers.²⁶ While more moderate in regards to the Arab Question than Hapoel Hatzair, Poale Zion still advocated for a society that excludes Arab labor.

¹⁸ Ibid.; Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 12.

¹⁹ Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 277-79.

²⁰ Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*, xx.

²¹ Jehuda Reinharz, “Old and New Yishuv: The Jewish Community in Palestine at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” *Jewish Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (1993/94): 57.

²² Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 50-51.

²³ Kolatt, “The Zionist Movement and the Arabs,” 4.

²⁴ “The Idea of the Labour,” *ha-Po’el ha-Tza’ir*, (September 18, 1912): 1, quoted in Abigail Jacobson, “Sephardim, Ashkenazim and the ‘Arab Question’ in Pre-First World War Palestine: A Reading of Three Zionist Newspapers,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (April, 2003): 115.

²⁵ Ber Borochov, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle: A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Problem; Selected Writings*, ed. by Moshe Cohen (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), 188, 196.

²⁶ Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 72.

Later, however, in a 1917 address titled “Eretz Yisrael in Our Program and Tactics,” Borochov states, “there will be sufficient land to accommodate both the Jews and the Arabs. Normal relations between the Jews and Arabs will and must prevail,” demonstrating a burgeoning inclination towards Arab inclusion.²⁷ While Poale Zion was a labor Zionist group that by definition excluded Arabs by focusing on and employing Jewish labor, the party was still more moderate on the Arab Question than Hapoel Hatzair. The party even shifted towards promoting inclusion of Arabs months before the Balfour Declaration.

Workers parties were not the only labor Zionists to exclude Arabs; it was an attitude held by many Jews in Palestine. A typical labor Zionist, Yehoshua Barzilay, represented the common view that the Jews should be separate from Arabs, following the model of German settlers in Palestine.²⁸ At the same time, Barzilay “believed in the possibility of Jewish-Arab coexistence on the basis of national autonomy” once Jewish labor was strong enough.²⁹ In comparison, a more opinionated Yosef Haim Brenner saw his Arab neighbors as “sworn enemies” and decried “the idealistic approach as always false.”³⁰ Ultimately, Brenner was an exclusionist for different reasons than Smilansky, Borochov, and Barzilay: while Smilansky, Borochov, and Barzilay argued for excluding Arabs to realize labor Zionism’s goals, Brenner argued for excluding the Arabs from a Zionist society because of fear, fear that the Arabs and Jews could never move past their mutual hatred and fear of Arabs’ strength in the land.

Exclusion of Arabs seems indicative of anti-Arab racism for both Brenner and the prominent Avshalom Feinberg, who extolled the virtues of complete separation and exclusion of Arabs, via barbed wire, in a letter to Henrietta Szold.³¹ His mentor and comrade, Aaron Aaronson in a report submitted to British Intelligence in 1917, explained that Arabs “could not be regarded as potential partners in negotiations and agreement on the future of Palestine.”³² This clearly demonstrated that his ideal future Zionist society would exclude Arabs. Both members in the workers parties and Zionists of various professions thus saw that excluding Arabs was the only path towards realizing Zionism.

Ze’ev Smilansky’s cousin, Moshe Smilansky, is a good example of an intermediary between the inclusion and exclusion camps; while in 1908 he was still a true exclusionist of Arabs, only three years later in 1911, he had evolved into a moderate inclusionist.³³ In 1908, Moshe Smilansky argued “let us not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin lest our children adopt their ways and learn from their ugly deeds. Let all those who are loyal to the Torah avoid ugliness and that which resembles it and keep their

²⁷ Borochov, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle*, 130.

²⁸ Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 55-56.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

³⁰ Yosef Haim Brenner, *Collected Writings* [Hebrew], Vol. 2, (Tel Aviv: 1964), 321, quoted in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 55.

³¹ Avshalom Feinberg, *Writings and Letters* [Hebrew], (Tel Aviv: 1971), quoted in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 56.

³² Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 57.

³³ Gila Ramras-Rauch, “Moshe Smilansky: Utopia and Reality,” in “The Image of the Arab in Israeli Literature and The image of the Jew in Arabic Literature,” special issue, *Shofar* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1989): 4.

distance from the fellahin and their base attributes.”³⁴ Albeit not a true integrationist, in his later years, Moshe Smilansky recognized the importance of learning Arabic language and culture and working with Turkish and Arab Nationalist leaders because he believed “that there is no inherent and inevitable conflict between the national hopes of Jews and Arabs... because our perspective is not political [like the Arab’s] but rather economic and cultural... autonomy.”³⁵ Moshe Smilansky shifted from excluding Arabs to including Arabs in his later years, believing in a Jewish majority state with peaceful inclusion of the local Arab minority, similar to the beliefs of his mentor and friend, the diaspora Zionist Ahad Ha’am.³⁶

Most political and cultural Zionists differed from their labor brethren; as idyllic thinkers instead of committed laborers, they took the idealistic approach to Zionism and argued that Arabs must be included in a Jewish society. In 1900, among more practical inclusionists, Jerusalemite Arabist Eliyahu Sappir wrote a largely ignored article saying only Christian writers can be anti-Zionist and arguing the future of Zionism depends on the goodwill of those “close to us and to our hearts,” the Arab Muslims.³⁷ Sappir’s respect for Muslim Arabs demonstrates that he envisioned a Jewish society supported by the benevolence of the Arabs within the society who ought to be included in the Zionist dream.

First, in an address in 1905 to the Seventh Zionist Congress and then printed in 1907 in a Russian journal, Palestinian born Zionist politician Yitzhak Epstein recognized that “The Arab, like any person, is strongly attached to his homeland” and noted that “if instead of dispossessing the Druze of Metullah, we had divided the land with them, then we would... surely be living with our neighbors and working our land in peace.”³⁸ While Sappir alludes to a Jewish society with Arab inclusion, Epstein takes his concept a step further and claims that the only ethical solution is a society divided amongst the Arabs and Jews, who are both equally entitled to their shared homeland. Furthermore, he states that there are two moral imperatives of Zionists settling near Arabs: “the Hebrew people... respects not only the individual rights of every person, but also the national rights of every people and tribe” and “the people Israel honors and respects their aspirations, and when it comes in contact with them, it cultivates their national recognition.”³⁹ As Gorny notes, this made Epstein “first to state explicitly that the implementation of Zionism depended on Arab consent,” demonstrating his commitment to an inclusive Jewish society.⁴⁰

While Sappir and Epstein are moderate yet idealistic, there were many Zionists who advocated for extreme forms of inclusion of Arabs in a Jewish society through complete integration or assimilation. Palestinian immigrant writer Rabbi Benjamin, the pseudonym of Yehoshua Radler-Feldman, was an extreme advocate of Arab inclusion in

³⁴ Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 50.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

³⁶ *Ibid.*; Ramras-Rauch, “Moshe Smilansky: Utopia and Reality,” 3.

³⁷ Eliyahu Sappir, “Hatred of Israel in Arab Literature,” *ha-Shiloah* (1900), quoted in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 41.

³⁸ Alan Dowty, ““A Question That Outweighs All Others”: Yitzhak Epstein and Zionist Recognition of the Arab Issue,” *Israel Studies* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 41, 49.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁰ Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 43.

a Jewish society of Palestine.⁴¹ In an article for *ha-Me'orer*, in 1907, he proposes complete integration of Arab and Jews through intermarriage to “become one kind.”⁴²

Sephardic Palestinian Zionists seem to promote cultural assimilation. The Sephardic Hebrew language newspaper of Palestine, *ha-Herut*, writes that it is for “hopes for coexistence and co-operation between the Jewish and Arab community in Palestine.”⁴³ In a more drastic step than the newspapers editors, the Sephardic Zionist Dr. Nissim Malul argues in a June 1913 *ha-Herut* article for complete cultural into Arabic culture to “consolidate our Semitic nationality,” noting “if we introduce European elements into our culture, we shall simply be committing suicide.”⁴⁴ Understandably as a Sephardic Jew, Dr. Malul was comfortable within Arab culture. Citing famous Sephardic philosophers like Maimonides and Judah Halevi, he argued that Jewish culture is only redeemable through integration with its Semitic cultural brother, Arab culture.⁴⁵

In response, Avraham Ludivpol argued that Arab culture was inferior, that Arabs will become integrated into Jewish culture, and that “the indigenous people will have to learn Hebrew and this necessity will have its effect.”⁴⁶ While Gorny argues that Ludivpol is a “separatist” or exclusionist and Ludivpol’s philosophy is rooted in anti-Arab racism, his belief in Arab-Jewish integration, regardless of the direction and the tone, qualifies him as a Zionist who supported Arab inclusion into Jewish society, albeit at the cost of their Arab identity.⁴⁷

In summation, while early Palestinian labor Zionists promoted exclusion of Arabs, as a strategy for developing Jewish labor and realizing their Zionist dream, early Palestinian political and cultural Zionists promoted the inclusion of Arabs, as demonstrated through their treatises, articles, and speeches from 1882 to 1917. When separating these early Zionists neatly into different subgroups exclusionists and inclusionists, labor or political and cultural, it is important to remember the diversity of opinions within each group. Many of the people who shared similar ideologies frequently attacked, responded, and criticized each other because at the end of the day, these Palestinian Zionists were part of the same community. While Zionists in the diaspora had the luxury of a whole world to avoid their opponents, the early Zionist community in the small land of Palestine constantly confronted, challenged, and grew from the lively debate over the future of their new Jewish Society.

⁴¹ Yehoshua Radler-Feldman “Arab Prophecy,” *ha-Me'orer*, 1907, quoted in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 45.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³ Jacobson, “Sephardim, Ashkenazim and the 'Arab Question' in Pre-First World War Palestine: A Reading of Three Zionist Newspapers,” 124.

⁴⁴ Nissim Malul, “Our Position in Our Country,” *ha-Herut*, June 1913, quoted in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 48.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁶ Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, 54.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 54.

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